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• In 2005, following the phase-out of the Agreement on Textile and Clothing, the EU and the US 
have implemented new restrictions on textile and clothing imports from China. Available data 
suggests that the shortfall thus imposed on China, in terms of textile exports to the EU and to 
the US, is significant 
• West African cotton-producing countries are very dependant on cotton earnings for their 
GDP and over the last years, most of the growth of their cotton exports’ revenues has 
resulted from increasing exports to China. 
• The results of a model of Chinese and West African cotton exchanges suggests that Chinese 
imports of West African cotton are strongly dependant on its textile exports to the EU and the 
US. 
• EU and US safeguards against Chinese textile might have seriously hampered West African 
cotton exports opportunities over the past two years. 
 
Introduction 
On 1st January 2005, the Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC) expired and 
all the quotas on the textile sector should have been removed. Such liberalization 
was subject to an investigation as to its likely effects. According to a survey based 
on over 43,000 Google hits related to “textile apparel quota” by researchers of the 
Harvard Center for Textile and Apparel Research (Abernathy et al., 2005), a 
prevailing view has emerged among scholars: textile exports from low-wage 
countries that faced restrictions under the ATC, and from China in particular, 
should have increased massively and rapidly.  
 
Since textile production is one of the main components of cotton demand, and 
since Chinese cotton production capacities are already largely being used, a 
major side effect of this liberalization should have been to foster a significant 
expansion of Chinese cotton imports and a subsequent rise of cotton’s world 
price. According to Fang and Babcock (2003), the liberalization of the textile 
sector could have boosted the growth of China’s imports of cotton by about 70 to 
100% yearly until 2010. Such an increase would have led cotton prices to climb 
annually between 7.3 and 11% on the world market2. 
                                                 
1 Claire Delpeuch is a research assistant in international economics at GEM. Comments are most welcome: Claire.delpeuch@sciences-po.fr
2 These figures are extra increases over a baseline forecast assuming the continuity of prevailing trade policy and Food and Agricultural 
Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) macroeconomic forecasts. 
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However, new safeguards against textile imports from China have been 
implemented by the European Union (EU) and by the United States (US) to 
protect their domestic textile industries. These agreements attenuate the expected 
effects of the ending of the ATC: by limiting the potential growth of Chinese textile 
exports, they limit the expansion of Chinese cotton imports. 
 
The media has extensively commented on the commercial negotiations over 
Chinese textile and on their consequences for the Western textile industry and 
consumers. However, the effects of these agreements go far beyond the interests 
of their direct participants. Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali export an increasingly 
high share of their cotton to China, and rely considerably on these export 
revenues for their GDP. EU and US safeguards may thus significantly affect them 
by depriving them of new export opportunities. 
 
 
 
ATC phase-out and Chinese textile trade 
A short history  
of textile protectionism 
Apparel manufacturing is a labour-intensive industry with little capital investment 
requirements. Since the second half of the 20th century, apparel has thus been 
increasingly produced in developing countries and exported to industrialized 
countries.3 In order to protect domestic industries, developed countries 
established bilateral agreements imposing import quotas, both on the basis of the 
origin country and of the product, when imports caused a risk of “market 
disruption”.4  These agreements were implemented, under the General 
Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), in the Short Term Arrangements for 
international trade in cotton textiles in 1961 and then under the Long Term 
Arrangement from 1962 to 1973.  
 
They were first codified in the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) in 1974, which 
allowed member countries to maintain their quotas but committed them to 
progressively increase the quantities according to targeted growth rate that ranged 
annually between 1 and 10%. The MFA was then replaced by the Agreement on 
Textile and Clothing (ATC) in 1995 and a four-step schedule for the progressive 
phase-out of quotas was settled. It implied that an increasing number of product 
categories were to be freed from quota restrictions and that the remaining quotas 
were to be regularly increased. All quotas were to be removed at the end of a 10-
year period, by 31st December 2004. 
 
 
How would a complete removal of ATC  
quotas have affected the Chinese textile market? 
MFA, and then ATC, quotas have resulted into trade diversion by fragmenting the 
world production and shifting production from low-cost to higher-cost production 
regions. Basic mechanisms underlying the removal of the ATC are not 
controversial. The main expected effect is an efficiency gain: the phasing-out of 
quotas means that production and resource allocation decisions are affected more 
by economic fundamentals and are more coherent with basic trade theory. 
Competition among exporters in producing countries intensifies and the artificial 
pattern of production should shift towards a more “natural” production pattern that 
is consistent with comparative factor prices and productivity (especially labour cost 
and productivity), international exchange rates, transport costs and tariff rates.  
 
                                                 
3 In 2001, Developing countries’ textile and apparel exports in nominal dollars were almost seven times their 1980 level and accounted 
for 12% of total exports whereas developed countries’ textile and apparel exports were only over two times their 1980 level and 
accounted for only 3% of total exports (Gelb, 2007). 
4 « The definition of “market disruption” adopted by the Contracting Parties in 1960 entailed the possibility of singling out imports of 
particular products from particular countries as the disrupting source » (Francois and Wôrz, 2006). 
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Concretely, a complete liberalization should have benefited developing countries 
to the extent that they were affected by the quotas, especially those that produce 
both textile and apparel and can engage in high quality, high value-added and 
diversified production. This is typically the case, among others, of China. Indeed, 
China enjoys a very strong comparative advantage in textile and apparel 
production, and was the country most affected by EU and US restrictions 
contained in the ATC. According to Buelens (2005), it faced both the highest 
number of quotas and the biggest share of binding quotas (over 60%)5. 
Appelbaum (2005) summarizes China’s potential for increased textile and apparel 
production and exports with the four following factors: the country has the world’s 
widest apparel offer (it exports the highest number of Harmonized System 10-
digits products); the country is well endowed with raw materials (China has the 
world’s largest production capacities for cotton, silk and man made fibres); the 
Yuan/Dollar exchange rate makes Chinese exports very competitive; and Chinese 
companies enjoy skilled and low-cost labour and managerial, financial and 
marketing expertise from Hong Kong and Taiwan investors. According to a report 
of the United State Trade Commission (USITC) on the Assessment of the 
Competitiveness of Certain Foreign Suppliers to the US Market (USITC, 2004), 
with the removal of the ATC, “China [was] expected to become the «supplier of 
choice» for most US importers” (…) “because of its ability to make almost any type 
of textiles and apparel products at any quality level at a competitive price”. 
 
The effects of ATC phase-out have been more precisely predicted using several 
econometric models. The results and the characteristics of the studies estimating 
the consequences of ATC phase-out on Chinese textile trade flows are presented 
in appendix 1 (page 10). According to Li and Mohanty (2003), “studies examining 
the effects of MFA elimination on textile trade have unanimously concluded that 
China would be one of the primary beneficiaries of quota eliminations” and that the 
quantitative effects should be sizeable, especially regarding clothing.  
Indeed, deeming that the outcomes of the study that generated the smallest 
figures can be considered as a minimal impact estimate of the ATC phase-out, it 
appears that the quotas’ removal would have boosted China’s textile exports by at 
least 10.8% and its apparel exports by at least 100.7% (Mlachila and Yang, 2004).  
Ultimate data trends also confirm this prediction. Despite being very limited, the 
2002 partial liberalization caused a major trade flow shift. China greatly increased 
its exports of the newly liberalized products to the US and EU market, in some 
cases up to several hundred percent. Other countries also managed to benefit 
from this market opening but to a far smaller extent6. 
 
 
 
New safeguards against  
Chinese textile7
The prediction of such significant changes has frightened the European and the 
American textile and clothing industries and their governments. In 2002, the textile 
sector still employed over 2 million people in the EU and 800 000 people in the 
US. In Greece, Italy or Portugal, the share of the textile sector in overall 
manufacturing employment exceeded 10% (Buelens, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Since one of the major contention points related to China’s demand  to join the WTO in the late 1990s was apparel and textiles, 
China’s WTO accession protocol allowed the US and the EU to increase their quota quantities by a slower rate than the agreed ATC 
rates and, eventually, to set new safeguard measures or re-impose quotas. 
6 In 2002, EU imports from China of newly liberalized products increased by 53 % in value and by 164 % in volume. Total imports from 
all origins in those products increased only by 1 % in value and 10 % in volume (EU 2003). 
7 A chronology of the negotiations which led to the adoption of these new safeguards is given in Appendix 2, page 11. 
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China’s WTO accession protocol allows both for “Textile Specific Safeguard” 
(TSSC), and “product-specific safeguards”8. However, quite understandably, 
neither the US nor the EU, have launched such unilateral restrictions. It is quite 
obvious that they would have lost tremendously from Chinese retaliation 
measures. Europeans and Americans therefore initiated “market disruption” 
investigations only to pressure the Chinese government to sign Memorandums of 
Understanding (MoU),. According to these agreements (respectively signed in 
June and December 2005), the growth rate of a range of particularly sensitive 
textile products is restricted for the three following years. They cover about 40% of 
China’s textile exports to the EU and about 24 % of its textile exports to the US 
(Cuisson, 2006 and OTEXA, 2006). The agreed growth levels range between 8 
and 12.5% annually in the EU-China MoU, with an average 10.5%. The Sino-US 
MoU sets average growth rates of 10% for 2006, 12.5% for 2007 and 15% for 
2008 for textile, and 12.5% for 2006 and 2007 and 15% for 2008 for apparel 
(Jones, 2005). 
 
 
To what extent do these  
safeguards impede Chinese 
textile exports’ growth? 
Combined, European and American markets account for more than a third of total 
Chinese textile exports. Between 1995 and 2004, the combined EU and US 
markets’ share for Chinese textile and apparel exports fluctuated between 37 and 
42% in value9. If the MoUs effectively greatly limit potential exports, the effect of 
these measures could be far from negligible.  
 
Estimating the impact of the MoUs would require comparing the estimated growth 
rate of Chinese textile and apparel exports in a complete ATC phase-out scenario 
and this growth rate in the presence of the restrictions. Unfortunately, most of the 
available trade data is in value, while the growth rates as specified in the MoUs 
are in volume. Moreover, figures of the estimated impact of a complete ATC 
phase-out, as reported in table 2 are not product-specific but averages. They are 
therefore probably significantly under-estimated for the most “sensitive” 
products10, precisely, those covered by the MoUs. However, an estimate “back of 
the envelope” of the effects of the MoUs on aggregated Chinese exports to the EU 
and the US may be computed. The most interesting way of doing it is to take the 
smallest figures for all parameters in order to be able to reckon the result as a 
minimal impact. 
 
First, the estimates of ATC phase-out effects, which are percentage changes over 
a non-quota removal baseline, are converted into an absolute growth rate for the 
ATC quota-removal scenario. To do so, it is considered that, in 2006, in the 
absence of the ATC phase-out, the “natural” growth rate of Chinese textile exports 
would have been at least equal to their growth rate in the last year before the 
removal of quotas; that is 200411. This growth rate is then multiplied by the 
smallest estimate of ATC phase-out’s effect (that is, +100.7% for apparel and 
+10.8% for textile according to Mlachila and Yang, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 TSSC allow to restrain imports that are “due to market disruption, [and] threaten to impede the orderly development of trade in these 
textile and apparel products” for one year (renewable up to 2008) without negotiating with China (WTO, 2001, paragraph 242a). 
“Product-specific safeguards” allow to limit any import’s growth for three years (renewable for two), but only after investigation that 
determined that China’s exports are “the cause” of market disruption (WTO, 2001, section 13). 
9 Calculations realized with Comtrade data. 
10 According to Buelens (2005), the exports’ growth rate of most sensitive products may have been of up to 1250% in value and 2298% 
in volume. 
11 The 2004 growth rate has been calculated using Comtrade data. 
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The effect of the safeguards on the potential 2006 growth rate is then calculated 
as the variation between the “natural” 2006 growth rate and the estimated growth 
rate for 2006 in the presence of quotas12. Table 1 sums up the results: 
 
Table 1: Estimated effect of the MoUs on the growth rate of Chinese  
textile exports’ to the EU and the US in 2006 
 
Growth rate 
2004 2006 no quota 2006 MoUs 
Restrictive Effect 
of the MoUs 
26% 45% 34% 24% 
 
Considering the complete phasing-out of ATC as the baseline, and assuming a 
number of simplifying assumptions, the implementation of the MoUs is found to 
limit the growth rate of the aggregated Chinese textile exports to the EU and to the 
US in 2006 by 24%. 
 
 
 
Linking Chinese textile Exports  
to Chinese cotton imports from West Africa 
 
How much, then, may this limitation have turned into a cotton import growth 
limitation, especially from the cotton-dependant countries Benin, Burkina Faso and 
Mali?  
 
Since “mill-demand for fibre is determined by textile output” (Fang and Babcock, 
2003), the increase in demand for Chinese textile that would have resulted from a 
complete elimination of EU and US ATC quotas would have translated into an 
increase in demand for cotton within China. Supply constraints (water and land 
use mainly) are expected to prevent a subsequent production increase to fulfil the 
increase in demand. The complete elimination of US and EU textile quotas would 
thus foster a rise in China’s cotton imports, amongst other sources, from West 
Africa.  
 
Figure 1, page 6, illustrates these mechanisms by which shocks on the Chinese 
textile market may affect the West African cotton market. Then, to link directly the 
textile quota removal to the potential increase in West African cotton exports to 
China, the elasticity of Chinese imports of West African cotton to Chinese textile 
exports to the EU and the US is estimated by building a Sino-West African cotton 
trade model.13 The main finding of the model is to asses that a 1% increase in 
Chinese textile exports to the EU and the US provokes a 1.8 % increase in 
Chinese cotton imports from West African cotton-producing countries. 
 
                                                 
12 For the reasons mentioned above, this required a few simplifying assumptions. The estimate is therefore conducted assuming: 
- That the 2006 average growth rate allowed by the MoU is as estimated by Jones (2005) and the European Commission 
(2005), that is, 10.75% in the EU and 12.5% in the US. 
- That the average shares of restricted products in total EU and US Chinese textile and apparel imports are as estimated by 
Cuisson (2005) and OTEXA (2005), that is, respectively, 40% and 24%. 
- That the products concerned by the restrictions do not have higher growth rate potentials than the non-restricted product, that 
is, that they would have grown at the same estimated “natural” growth rate in the absence of MoUs. 
- That the respective share of the EU and the US in aggregated Chinese exports to the EU and the US in 2006 would have 
been the same as in 2004, that is, respectively, 53% and 47%. 
13 Aggregated Chinese cotton imports from West African countries are regressed on aggregated Chinese textile exports to the EU and 
the US. The precise specifications of the model as well as its outcomes are described in appendix 3 (pages 12 and 13). 
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Figure 1: Impact of the phase-out of quotas on Chinese textile  
on the West African cotton market 
 
 
 
Box 1: Underlying mechanisms to figure 1 
 
Figure 1 represents a world composed solely of China and the rest of 
world in the textile market and China and West Africa in the cotton 
market. China is a net exporter of textile and a net importer of cotton, 
while West Africa is a net exporter of cotton. 
 
Panel (a) represents the Chinese textile market. ACB is the export 
demand for Chinese textile, DEF the national demand and DEGH the 
total demand. The existence of quotas causes the export demand to 
be kinked at C and thus the total demand to be kinked at G. 
price priceprice
Quantity Quantity Quantity
Quantity
H'
price
Pt
A
B
B'
C
D
E
F
G
H
St
a. Chinese textile market
b. Chinese cotton market c. World cotton market d. West African cotton market
Pc'
Pc
Pc*'
Pc*
Pc^
           X X' Y Y' X*  X*'  Y^' Y^ X^ X^'
I
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ED '
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Sc^
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Panel (b) represents the Chinese cotton market. The cotton demand, 
IJK, is derived from the textile demand and is therefore also kinked in 
J.14 Since China does not produce enough cotton for domestic 
consumption, in the absence of trade, the price of cotton in China 
would be Pc. Panel (d) represents the West African cotton market. 
Since West Africa is a net exporter of cotton, in the absence of trade, 
cotton price in West Africa would be Pc^. The confrontation of 
Chinese excess demand, ED and West African excess supply, ES 
results in a World equilibrium with world price Pc*, depicted in panel 
(c), transportation costs being neglected. At Pc*, West African 
exports to China amount to the quantity X*. 
 
With the elimination of ATC quotas, Chinese textile exports demand 
shifts to ACB’ and total Chinese textile demand to DEH’. Chinese 
cotton demand thus also shifts upward to IJK’, and cotton price in 
China increases to Pc’. Producers adjust to this price increase by 
raising their production. However, water and land constraints prevent 
domestic production to increase as much as domestic consumption 
(Li, 2003 and Fang and Babcock, 2003). Excess demand on the 
World market consequently increases to ED’, leading to a higher 
World price Pc*’. West African exports thus increase from X* to X*’. 
 
For West African producers, the gain from the removal of ATC quotas 
in China is therefore equal to the difference between X*xPc* and 
X*’xPc*’, the sum of the yellow and the red areas in panel (d).15 
Symmetrically, the red and yellow areas represent the shortfall 
incurred by West African cotton producers in consequence of the re-
imposition of quotas on Chinese textile exports by the EU and the 
US, that is, exactly what this policy brief aims at assessing.  
                                                 
14 For simplicity, cotton demand is considered for mill-use only. 
15 The yellow area is West African cotton consumers’ lost and the red area the 
net welfare gain for West Africa. 
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Estimating the shortfall for  
West African countries 
Coupling the figures both of the retraining extent of the MoUs on Chinese 
exports to the EU and the US and the elasticity between these exports and 
Chinese cotton imports from West Africa reveals that the MoUs could 
impede the extra growth of West African cotton exports to China, due to the 
removal of ATC quotas, by about 45%. And, according to a report of the 
French Embassy in Beijing, China was responsible for all the growth of 
African cotton exports over the last three years (Mission Economique de 
l’Ambassade de France en Chine, 2006). This is to say that, limiting the 
region’s export possibilities to China in fact pretty much means limiting the 
region’s production growth perspective. In absolute terms, this implies, for 
example that, because of the MoUs, in 2006, Benin’s cotton exports would 
grow only by 59 to 67% instead of 73 to 89%. 
 
Of course, West African countries currently may not have the productive 
capacities to increase their exports massively16, and these figures are only 
estimations17. However, they do suggest that the shortfall incurred by West 
African cotton-producing countries may be substantial. It may be all the 
more significant because a stronger increase in Chinese demand would 
most probably have pushed world cotton prices to a higher level18. 
 
In Mali, Burkina Faso and Benin, cotton exports represent between 5 and 
almost 9% of GDP and between 88 and 160% of the food import balance. 
The dependence of the rural population on cotton is also very significant. 
Cotton is the main cash crop and often the most profitable, not easily 
substitutable, crop. Its cultivation would make up the livings of about 10 
million people in West Africa. And, besides being an important source of 
revenue both at the national and the household level, cotton cultivation 
positively influences the agricultural production, allows for health, physical 
and social infrastructure improvements in cotton-growing areas and pushes 
to better alphabetization schemes and regional cooperation (Oxfam, 2002). 
 
A large research corpus examined the cotton sectors of Sub-Saharan 
countries and this literature unanimously underlines the significance of 
cotton trade for their development as well as the major impacts of external 
price and quantity variations on the living conditions of producers and rural 
population. Minot and Daniels (2002) found, for example, that a 40% 
reduction in farm gate prices provokes a short-run reduction of growers’ 
income by 21%, a 7% reduction of per capita rural income, and a 40 to 48% 
rise of the incidence of poverty among the rural population in general. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This paper tends to show that EU and US safeguards may significantly 
negatively impact on West African economies. Its conclusion therefore may 
be used to argue in favour of a rapid and complete ending of the quotas for 
a new reason19. But most importantly, it provides a new example of the 
 
16 Shepherd and Delpeuch (2007) suggest that the supply elasticity in West Africa is very weak and has been declining since 
the middle of the 1990s. 
17 Despite a result check with the use of a panel model, the lack of data and the “Lucas critique” imply that findings have to be 
taken very carefully. Moreover, the paper’s hypothesis relies on the assumption that ATC phasing-out would result in a global 
textile production increase. Most researchers agree on this, but not all of them. For example, Fok (2006) is sceptical over the 
fact that ATC phasing-out would provoke an increase in global cotton demand, and in cotton’s world price because it would 
increase China’s pricing power at the expense of other producing countries. 
18 It is beyond the scope of this paper to estimate the price impact of the MoUs, however, several papers have shown that the 
quotas’ phase-out should have provoked a significant world price increase and since the effect of the MoUs in terms of quantity 
seems to be significant, the impact in terms of price may also be significant. 
19 According to an OECD study (2003), “Canada, the EU and the USA are again and again expected to experience substantial 
increases in welfare from ATC reform” thanks to “lower consumer prices and more efficient resource allocation”. 
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indirect and sometimes damaging results of some western protectionist 
policies. As economic matters become increasingly interconnected, this 
example encourages policy makers to pay more attention to the multiple 
and indirect consequences of their policies and to find more equitable 
equilibria to satisfy the interests of all the parties involved. This article thus 
does not aim at minimizing the problems faced by Western textile industry 
professionals but rather at suggesting that the EU should fully assume the 
outcomes of its policies. In this case, for example, the EU could have 
provided compensation by agreeing to diminish its agricultural subsidies or 
to increase the funds allocated to “aid for trade” strategies that may help 
West African countries in taking full advantage of trade reforms such as the 
phase-out of textile quotas. 
 
This example also highlights what should be avoided in the Doha Round of 
negotiations. Initially, the textile quotas’ elimination was designed as an 
incentive to convince the developing countries of accepting the creation of 
the WTO (Francois and Wörz, 2006). If developing countries are to remain 
confident in the multilateral trading system, further concessions that will be 
offered should be implemented in a much more efficient and transparent 
manner. This also means that protectionist economies should anticipate 
liberalisation schedules more – for example, the liberalisation of agricultural 
products – in order to avoid the panic and the uncontrolled effects it lead to 
when the ATC finally expired. 
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Appendix 1: A chronological summary of findings on the effects of ATC implementation on Chinese textile and apparel trade flows, at mid-2006. 
 
Paper Methodology Scenario Quota removal’s impact on Chinese textile and 
apparel trade: % over the baseline 
 
Li and Zhai 
(2000) 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
with 41 sectors and 10 households. 1995 
social accounting matrix. 15 years 
forecast. 
 
Baseline and 2 scenarios: ATC phase-out 
alone and WTO accession. 
Results of the WTO accession scenario, 2005: 
- Textile exports: 63.8%  
- Apparel exports: 214.1%. 
Ianchovina et 
al. (2000) 
Modified version of the Global Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) model20 that 
explicitly takes into account tariff 
exemptions on input imports for exports. 
Baseline and November 1999 WTO 
“Accession offer” scenario. Estimates for 
the period 1995-2005. 
No trade flow estimates (only world export 
shares) but their results show that studies, which 
fail to take tariff exemptions into account might 
overstate Chinese exports’ increase due to WTO 
accession as much as 75% in the apparel 
sector. 
 
Francois and 
Spinanger 
(2002) 
GTAP model (version 5), 23 sectors and 
25 regions. 1997 is the benchmark year. 
10 years forecast. 
Baseline and 3 scenarios: ATC phase-out, 
November 1999 WTO “accession offer”, 
and full accession. 
Results of the WTO accession scenario, 2007:  
- Textiles exports: 39% 
- Clothing exports: 168% 
 
Spinanger and 
Verma (2003) 
GTAP model. Reference to surveys 
conducted in Hong Kong (2000/2003) in 
which CEOs of 14 major textile 
enterprises and traders were asked 
about their sourcing plans in the 
future21. 1997 is the benchmark year. 
 
Baseline and 2 scenarios ATC phase-out 
alone and WTO accession. 
Results of the WTO accession scenario:  
- Textile exports: 39% 
- Apparel exports: 168% 
Mlachila and 
Yang (2004) 
GTAP model, updated until 200722. Baseline and WTO accession scenarios 
assuming different elasticities. 
Results of the standard GTAP elasticities 
scenario, 2007: 
- Clothing exports: 100.7%  
- Textile exports: 10.8%   
                                                 
20 For a detailed summary of the Centre for Global Trade Analysis GATP model characteristics, see, for example, Michla and Yang (2004), pp. 33-34. For full information on the model, see the web 
site dedicated to it: https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/default.asp. 
21 The results of the surveys are taken from Andriamananjara et al. (2004). 
22 Based on International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) indicators. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Box 1. Chronology of international efforts to postpone the phase-out of ATC quotas23
• March 2004: In the Istanbul Declaration, US and Turkey textile industry trade associations ask 
the WTO for a three-year extension of the phase-out. 
• June 2004: trade associations from 47 new countries join the Istanbul Declaration. 
• July 2004: Mauritius (joined by six other DCs in September) asks for an emergency WTO meeting. 
• October 26, 2004: prospects for the postponement of the phase-out are ruled out in an informal 
meeting of the WTO Council on Trade in goods. 
• December 10, 2004: China reaches a compromise with other developing countries, in which 
WTO assistance is offered to beneficiaries. 
• December 15, 2004: The Chinese Ministry of Commerce announces export taxes of 2 to 4% 
on certain textile and apparel products (as from January 1, 2005). 
 
Box 2. Chronology of negotiations between the EU and China 
• April 6, 2005: The European Commission publishes “Guidelines to the use of the TSSC” and 
sets alert levels for categories of products beyond which it would “consider launching market 
disruption investigations that could ultimately lead to the use of temporary safeguards as 
permitted by the TSSC”24. (European Commission, 2005) 
• April 24, 2005: Such investigations are launched for 9 categories of textile and apparel products25.  
• May 2005: The Commissioner for External Trade, Peter Mandelson, meets the Chinese Trade 
Minister, Bo Xilai, in Paris.  
• May 17, 2005: On the basis of trade data, urgency procedures are launched for two categories 
of products and formal consultation with China is requested.  
• May 23, 2005: The urgency procedures are approved by the Member States.  
• May 24, 2005: Commissioner Mandelson meets the Chinese vice Minister and Textile 
Negotiator, Gao Hucheng, in Brussels. They agree to intensify negotiations. 
• May 27, 2005: The Commission demands a formal consultation on the two categories of 
products. Under the terms of TSSC, China has two weeks to take action to restrain export 
growth in the specified categories to the level of the previous fourteen months before the 
importing country is be able to limit the exports to this same effect.  
• June 10, 2005: Peter Mandelson and Bo Xilai sign the MoU in Shanghai. The agreement 
manages the growth of Chinese textile imports to the EU until 2008: it takes effect on the 11th 
of June 2005 and is valid until the 31st December 2007 
                                                 
23 This chronology was established on the basis of a report for the US Congress (Gelb, 2007). 
24 See Buelens (2005), table 12, p. 16 for the formulae determining consultation levels and the levels below 
which the TSSC should not be invoked. 
25 EU textile categories have been created in the Council regulation (EEC) n°3030/93 of 12 October 2005 on 
common rules for imports of certain textile products from third countries. They regroup 8-digit references of 
the Combinated Nomenclature. 
Box 3. Chronology of negotiations between the US and China 26
• May 19, 2003: The CITA publishes its procedures for considering 
safeguard measures in the Federal Register. 
• July 24, 2003: CITA receives petitions from the American 
Manufacturing Trade Action Coalition, the American Textile 
Manufacturers Institute and the National Textile Association. 
• August 13, 2003: The CITA requests for public comments on the 
safeguard action demand on three textile product categories27 imports 
from China. 
• December 24, 2003: Formal notification of the safeguard is sent to 
the Chinese government. The CITA thus implements 12 months 
imports quotas on these products and requests consultation. 
• June – November 2004: Several textile and apparel trade 
organizations and employee unions issue a number of new safeguard 
petition on new products. The CITA each time repeats the procedure. 
• December 1, 2004: The US Association of Importers of Textiles and 
Apparel litigates proceedings against the US and the CITA in the US 
Court of International Trade for adopting safeguard measures on the 
basis of petitions denouncing market disruption risk for products still 
protected by quotas. 
• December 30, 2004: The US Court of International Trade comforts the 
importers’ association and the safeguard procedures are suspended. 
• April 27, 2005: Following an appeal of the Department of Justice, the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit cancels the Court of 
International Trade’s motion. 
• May 25, 2005: The Chinese Ministry of Commerce increases export 
taxes by 400% on certain textile and apparel products as from June 
2005. 
• November 2005: The safeguard measures are all implemented. 
• November 8, 2005: Rob Portman, US Trade representative, and Bo 
Xilai sign the MoU in London after seven rounds of negotiation. It will 
enter into force on January 1, 2007 and will last until December 31, 
2008. It does dot need to be ratified by the Congress. 
                                                 
26 This chronology was established on the basis of a report for the US Congress 
(Jones, 2005). 
27 The products categories are composed of 8-digits lines of the North American 
Industry Classification System. Their composition is available on OTEXA’s 
website: Http://Otexa.Ita.Doc.Gov/Corr.Htm. 
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Appendix 3: The model 
 
Specification 
Drawing on the abundant literature on cotton trade modelling, the following 
characteristics are adopted in the model: 
- Cotton demand is modelled as a derived demand depending on textile 
demand and on the cotton share of total fibre consumption at the mill level. Textile 
consumption is exogenous: cotton demand is regressed on textile exports to the 
EU and the US. Substitutability between fibres is controlled for according to 
relative cotton and man-made fibres prices. Indeed, when Fang, Colby and 
Babcock (2001) model inter-fibre competition in China, they note that “since 1989, 
relative price changes have become the dominant factor influencing cotton share”. 
The use of a price ratio rather than two prices results in higher significance of the 
estimates because it allows avoiding multicollinearity between the prices 
(Coleman and Thigpen, 1991). Polyester price is used as a proxy for man-made 
fibre. 
- Equations are specified in logs. This approach indeed avoids the exchange-
rate conversion problem (Clements and Lan, 2000): using only logarithmic 
changes, variations are independent of units. Logarithms also convert changes in 
variables into percentage changes and directly give the searched elasticity.  
- Finally, most studies use comprehensive cotton markets models, which do 
not only contain demand equations. In Fang and Babcock (2003), for example, the 
model also includes production, ending stocks and export equations and an import 
identity for closure. In this study, production and stock data will thus be tested as 
control variables. 
 
The base model is specified as follows: aggregated Chinese cotton imports from 
the three West African countries (“Mc”) are regressed on aggregated Chinese 
textile exports to the EU and the US (“Xt”). An index of cotton price to polyester 
price (“Apoly”) is used to control for fibre substitution. A double-log specification is 
used and the regression is conducted using Newey-West heteroskedasticity and 
auto-correlation consistent coefficient covariance. A stock control variable (“stock”) 
is used rather than a production variable, which is found to be insignificant at a 
10% level and to impede the explanatory power of the model28. 
The base model can thus be written as follows:  
Log (Mc) = α + ß1log (Xt) + ß2log (Apoly) + ß3log (Stock) 
The trade data is taken from Comtrade, in US$ trade value29. The A-index30 is 
used as a proxy for West African cotton price and is taken from the USDA Cotton 
and Wool Outlook 2005, as well as the world price of polyester and Chinese 
cotton production and stocks. The EU is defined as EU15 for the whole period as 
trade data is not available for EU25 equivalent for the years before EU 
enlargements. The sample covers the 1989-2004 period and only includes thirteen 
years since cotton exchanges between China and West Africa were missing for 
three of the sample years. No data was available for anterior years.  
This lack of data is a major weakness of the model.  Indeed, the number of 
observations is too small for the control tests to accurately report the quality of the 
model. To address this issue, the model is thus re-estimated in an expanded 
panel of Chinese cotton imports from the twenty-two major source countries31 
 
28 It seems coherent that stocks influence more directly imports than production since the model does not take domestic consumption 
and exports to the rest of the world into account. Furthermore, China has huge stocking capacities and has frequently changed its 
stocking policy thus influencing on global trade not only according to its own production capacities 
29 The SITC Rev.1 classification is used. Cotton is defined as category 263 and textile and apparel, respectively, as categories 65 and 
84. Chinese cotton imports from West Africa contain imports only from Mali and Benin. Too much data was missing to include imports 
from Burkina. However, since cotton production characteristics are very similar in the three countries, the elasticity found according to 
Mali and Benin data may be assumed to fit Sino-Burkinabese cotton exchanges. 
30 Cotlook Limited A index is an index calculated as an “average of offer quotation by cotton agents in Northern Europe”, taking into 
account the five less expensive prices out of fourteen origins. 
31 The panel includes all the source countries, which exports accounted for more than one million dollars in 2004, that is, Australia, 
Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Greece, India, Kazakhstan, Mali, Paraguay, Spain, Sudan, Syria, 
Togo, Turkey, USA, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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using the above specification. The number of observations is thus multiplied by 
twenty-two allowing the control tests to accurately report the quality of the model. 
Fixed country effects are added to control for countries’ specific characteristics. 
The Hausman test statistic confirms the appropriateness of the use of country 
fixed effects. 
Table2: Model outcomes 
 
Model α ß1 ß2 ß3
Base -10,8 (0,05**)
1,81 
(0,00***)
- 2,65 
(0,12)
-1,61 
(0,01***)
Panel -9,96 (0,1*) 
1,78 
(0,00***)
0,25 
(0,79)
-1,74 
(0,00***)
 
  Note: Probabilities are reported in brackets: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
 
The base model’s estimates are coherent with economic theory and with the 
hypothesis tested in this study: textile exports are found to have a significant 
positive impact on cotton imports, while the price ratio and the stocks have a 
significant negative impact. The effect of a 1% increase in Chinese textile exports 
to the EU and the US provokes a 1.81% increase in Chinese cotton imports from 
West Africa. The price elasticity (-2.65), though, seems to be much stronger than 
in most studies. However, the elasticity searched is often a pure demand/price 
elasticity, whereas the one captured in this model is an import/price elasticity and 
imports are more price elastic than consumption. Moreover, the model focuses on 
cotton imports from one origin only and the price ratio’s estimate may therefore 
reflect some kind of origin substitution that does not appear when modelling total 
cotton imports or demand. Econometrically, the model also appears to be 
coherent. All the explanatory variables are significant at a 10% level, ordinary 
least square assumptions are respected and the explanatory power of the model 
is of 0.84. 
 
Using the panel specification, the model’s outcomes are very close to the results 
previously obtained. The panel experiment thus confirms the accuracy of the first 
model and allows using its results in the remaining of this paper. 
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